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We are naturally led to the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Guru Nanak v. Sutter1 is a simple misreading of Oregon v. Smith,2 just as RLUIPA—
which the Ninth Circuit just upheld—misused Smith. But something odd is going on 
when neither counsel nor Court argues this.  What it means is that there such a consensus 
that the scrutiny regime still operates, that there is no need to discuss it, and no one ever 
thinks about it.  That is a serious mistake.  RLUIPA challenges the foundation of the 
scrutiny regime, and the Supreme Court has done so as well.  This suggests that those 
who would defend the scrutiny regime, either need to start arguing it explicitly, or join in 
its abandonment and start arguing the facts.  Counsel opposing RLUIPA in Nanak 
certainly do not realize what is going on.  They did not even argue that RLUIPA involved 
a misuse of Smith. And in a companion Ninth Circuit RLUIPA case, Christian Center v. 
Elsinore, there has been a persistent failure of those who would defend the scrutiny 
regime, to either argue in its defense, or to argue under the new Constitutional regime the 
Supreme Court has inaugurated.   
Nanak revolves around this section of RLUIPA, which elevates, to strict scrutiny, 
the level of scrutiny for exercise of religion in the following circumstance: a “substantial 
burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use 
regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments 
of the proposed uses for the property involved.”  And here is the crucial passage from the 
Nanak decision: “We decide that the County made an individualized assessment of Guru 
Nanak’s [application for a zoning permit to build a church], thereby making RLUIPA 
applicable, and that the County’s denial of Guru Nanak’s application constituted a 
substantial burden, as that phrase is defined by RLUIPA.  Because RLUIPA applies to 
this case, we address RLUIPA’s constitutionality pursuant to Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and decide that RLUIPA is a congruent and proportional 
exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.”3
This is a flagrant misconstruction of Oregon v. Smith. What counsel opposing 
RLUIPA did not point out is that the use of “individualized assessments” in RLUIPA, 
assumes—or rather, presumes—that health and welfare regulation affecting an exercise 
of religion is a policy of affecting an exercise of religion.  That is not Smith. Smith stood 
for exactly the opposite proposition, although the authors of RLUIPA used the terms 
from Smith in the legislation. 
The irony of Nanak is that in the using the Smith decision to uphold RLUIPA, 
Smith was defeated in his claim that he was wrongly denied unemployment 
compensation when he was dismissed for using peyote for religious purposes.  When the 
Smith Court discussed an “individualized governmental assessment,” it was referring to 
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2“a system of individual exemptions”4 as a policy, not an effect. When there was such a 
system, then strict scrutiny applied when it substantially burdened an exercise of religion.  
The Court did not mean that the operation of health and welfare regulations was 
inherently a “system of individual exemptions” and that all effects of the policy were to 
be subject to strict scrutiny with respect to an exercise of religion.  In short, 
“assessments” are not synonymous with “exemptions.”  Indeed, there was no evidence in 
Nanak that Sutter had turned its zoning policy into an effect in order to bar the new 
church.  Even the church did not contend this, but the Ninth Circuit blithely assumed it.  
“Individualized assessment” was conflated with “substantial burden.” 
In finding RLUIPA unconstitutional, the District Court had claimed in Elsinore 
that the fault with the Christian Center’s RLUIPA argument was that “[i]n determining 
whether to issue a zoning permit, municipal authorities do not decide whether to exempt a
proposed user from an applicable law, but rather whether the general law applies to the 
facts before it.”5 That’s not bad, but it misses the point.  The point is that RLUIPA 
conflates “exempt” and “apply.”  This is what the Court missed, and it did so because it 
could not believe that anyone was challenging the scrutiny regime of West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish. Indeed, the District Court found RLUIPA unconstitutional on the grounds that 
only the Court can say what, in fact, freedom of religion is—a Marbury argument which 
is quite beside the point unless the Court has West Coast Hotel clearly in view, which the 
Elsinore Court did not.  The Court was unconsciously acknowledging that RLUIPA 
infringes on the scrutiny regime, which of course it does, but that is as far as the Court 
could bring itself to go.  If Nanak goes up to the Supreme Court on appeal, the question 
should be, Does RLUIPA overrule West Coast Hotel v. Parrish? What would you care to 
bet that counsel will be too stupid to phrase the question in this way? 
Regardless of how the question is phrased, RLUIPA should be seen in the context 
of yet another case.  West Coast Hotel v. Parrish6 established the scrutiny regime, one of 
the corollaries of which is that an exercise of religion does not enjoy a higher level of 
scrutiny than minimum scrutiny with respect to laws of general applicability.  But are we 
still living in that era?  Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court held sodomy laws 
unconstitutional “furthers no legitimate state interest.”7 Obviously, this is not a test on 
the scrutiny regime.  Minimum scrutiny says that laws are constitutional if they are 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  Intermediate scrutiny says that laws are 
unconstitutional if they substantially further an important state interest.  The Lawrence 
test takes one term from each test.  It makes no sense as a scrutiny regime test, and it is 
not one. 
What the Court is doing is drawing from its unofficial jurisprudence, in which it 
decides which facts it considers important and wishes to see the law maintain.  Laws 
which maintain important facts are found constitutional, and this unofficial determination 
is made official through its expression in terms of scrutiny regime.  That is how the Court 
operates.  Lawrence simply makes it clear that that is how the Court has always operated.  
The Court now feels that liberty is more important than the scrutiny regime allows, so it 
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3breaks the scrutiny regime to give more individually enforceable rights with respect to 
liberty.  In Lawrence it does so explicitly.  Commentators wonder why the Court didn’t 
simply hold that there was no rational basis for sodomy laws.  Why didn’t the Court do 
what it could easily have done—keep its reasoning within the scrutiny regime?  Because 
the Court doesn’t like the scrutiny regime. 
The RLUIPA question is going to be addressed in the context of a simple dislike 
of the scrutiny regime and an informal analysis of facts of importance to the Court.  
Therefore it is important to argue the FACTS.  The scrutiny regime very conveniently 
allowed us to avoid the question, what in fact is an exercise of religion?  particulary with 
respect to the “laws of general applicability” test.  But that is over now, and advocates of 
RLUIPA can easily analogize freedom of religion to liberty.  If health and welfare 
regulation has to maintain liberty, does it not also have to maintain freedom of religion?  
On the other hand, the Christian Center did not argue in Elsinore that where an exercise 
of religion is exercised, is an indicium of an exercise of religion.  Nor did Guru Nanak 
argue that where individuals want to exercise religion, is an indicium of an exercise of 
religion.  Is the “free” in “free exercise” of religion, the way the Founders say liberty is 
an indicium of the protected exercise of religion?  Opponents of RLUIPA may wish to 
argue that that desire is not an indicium of the free exercise of religion, or if it is, that 
health and welfare regulation does not have a substantial impact on a desire.  Or, if it 
wishes to use the informal maintenance jurisprudence of Lawrence, it may argue that 
government is not obliged to maintain freedom of religion to extent of accommodating 
desires.   
Whatever the doctrines, we are now clearly in a Constitutional era in which 
lawyers have to argue what, in FACT, are such things as freedom of religion and liberty.  
Although Congress has clearly presumed discretion over what in FACT is freedom of 
religion in RLUIPA, we have left behind the era in which factual inquiries are left to the 
political system. Marci Hamilton, author of God and the Gavel and a strenuous opponent 
of RLUIPA and supporter of the scrutiny regime, fulminated against Guru Nanak in an 
email to me: “[R]eligious conduct is going to receive more protection than speech, which 
is perverse, to say the least.  Speech does not receive ‘strict scrutiny’ in circumstances 
where there is individualized assessment unless there are no procedural safeguards.  The 
land use schemes always have such safeguards built in.”  This is an historically 
significant comment because it reflects common reactions of defenders of the scrutiny 
regime: a denial that what is happening, is happening, and a total unwillingness to 
grapple with the change.   
 
